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Articles

Conflicting Obligations:
American Political Culture and the Law of the Workplace

Reuef Schiller*

In two articles previously published in this Journal, I described American labor and employment law, and then compared it with the Japanese
law of the workplace. l ) One of my conclusions was that, not surprisingly,
the contrasting cultures of Japan and the United States generated different
types of law regulating the employment contract. A similar contrast exists between labor and employment law regimes that developed at different times within the United States. American labor and employment law
developed in two waves. During the 1930s and 1940s, the United States
implemented a labor law regime that protected the right of workers to form
labor unions. Then, during the 1950s and 1960s, Congress and many state
legislatures passed laws aimed at eliminating employment discrimination
based on race, sex, rei igion, and national origin. Because these two regimes
developed at different times, in dramatically different political contexts,
American labor law, and American employment discrimination law were
based on different, sometimes contradictory, premises. Labor law was focused on the rights of the group, employment discrimination law on the
rights of individuals. By the end of the 1960s, the contradictions between
these prelnises resulted in doctrinal conflicts between the two areas of the
law, and,more importantly, between the two interest groups that depended

* Professor of Law, University of Cal ifornia, Hastings College of the Law. This a rticl e is based
on a lecture I gave at the Nihon University College of Law in June of 201 1. My thanks to Dean
Minoru Sugimoto an d all the faculty and staff at Nihon for their extrem ely generous hospitality. I am particularly indebted to Professor Yasuo Fukuda for making all the arran gemen ts
for my visit and for acting as my host. I would also like to thank Professor Rikiya Sakamato,
w ho acted as both a gracious host and a superb translator during my v isit. Finally, I would
like to thank Emily Yao for her excellent re search assistance with this art icle.
1) Reuel E. Schiller, Reg ulating the Workp lace: Th ree Models of Labor and Employm ent Law
in the United States, 29 NIHON UNIV. COMPo L. 138 (20 12); see also Renel E. Schiller, D(fferent

Cultures, Different Conflicts: Sex Discrimination Lmv and the United States and Japan, 28
NIHON . UNIV. COMPo L. 127 (201 1).
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on each regime for their legal rights. This conflict had a profound impact
on American politics at the end of the twentieth century.
American labor law is based on three basic principles: workplace majoritarianism, exclusive representation, and voluntarism. 2) A union is permitted
to bargain on behalf of workers in a particular workplace only if a majority
of those workers vote to have that union represent them. 3) This is known
as workplace majoritarianism. Once a union has received those votes, it
negotiates a collective bargaining agreement on behalf of all the workers
in the workplace, including those who did not vote for the union and those
who refuse to join the union. These dissenting workers may not get another
union to negotiate on their behalf. Nor may they bargain with the employer
directly. This is known as the principle of exclusive representation. 4)
Once the workers have chosen to be represented by a union, the government steps out of the process. S) The union and the employer negotiate
the contract. If they are unable to agree, differences are resolved through
the weapons of economic conflict: strikes, lockouts, replacement workers,
boycotts, picketing. American labor law explicitly forbids the government
from resolving these disputes. Similarly, disputes that arise under collective bargaining agreements are resolved through private arbitration, the arbitrators having been picked by the union and the employer. Absent exceptional circumstances, American courts simply enforce the results of these
private arbitrations, regardless of the merits of a particular decision. 6 ) This
system of industrial relations is known as volunterism.
Workplace majoritarianism, exclusive representation, and voluntarism
are not the only models of labor law available to policy-makers.7) They
developed in the United States for specific, historical reasons. Each reflected aspects of the political culture of the 1930s and 1940s, the decades

2) Schiller, Regulating the Workplace, 29 NIHoN UNIV. COMPo L. 138 (2012).
3) 29 U.S.c. § 159 (2013).
4) 1.1. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332, 333 (1944) and Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition, 420 U.S . 50, 64-60, 70 (1975).
5) National Labor Relations Act, S 2926, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess ., Congressional Record 78
(June 6, 1934): 10559. See also Senate Committee on Education and Labor, National Labor
Relations Act, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 1935, S. Rep. 573; Terminal Railroad Association of St.
Louis v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1,6 (1943).
6) United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co. , 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
Katherine Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE LJ. 1509, 1515,
1531-35 (1980-81).
7) KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 494-765 (Leo Kanowitz trans.
2002); STEFAN LI NGE MANN ET AL., EMPLOYM ENT & LABOR LAW IN GERMANY 52-68 (2008); FOLKE SCHMIDT, LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS lN SWEDEN (1977).
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in which the foundational statutes of American labor law - the National
Labor Relations Act, and the Labor Management Relations Act (generally
referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act) - were passed. Voluntarism, for example, was a product of two different developments in American politics.
The first of these was the extreme governmental hostility towards labor
unions in nineteenth and early twentieth century.8) During that time, federal and state courts frequently enjoined labor union activities - strikes,
boycotts, organizational campaigns - and incarcerated labor union leaders.
State and local police forces often supplemented private security forces in
suppressing labor activity. When unions were able to use their political
strength to pass legislation favorable to working people, the laws were frequently held unconstitutional by courts. Consequently, when, during the
1930s, unions finally had a hospitable political and judicial climate, many
of labor's advocates, particularly those belonging to the country's largest
labor federation, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), sought to create a legal regime that prohibited the government from entering into labor
disputes or involving itself in the formation of or interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements.
By the end of the 1930s, however, not all trade unionists were convinced
that the government should remain neutral in the battle between labor and
management. In particular, left-leaning unions affiliated with the Congress
of Industrial Organizations (CIO) hoped to use their newly acquired political power to harness governmental actors to their side of the collective bargaining process. 9) Labor, management, and the state would work together
to manage the economy. This vision of codetermined industrial planning
did not survive the end of World War II.IO) Postwar strike waves soured
public opinion on unions. This, in turn, emboldened American businesses
to launch a counter-offensive against the labor movement. At the same
time, the rise of anticommunism in the years immediately following the
War caused the CIO to purge from its ranks many of its most statist leaders.
As a result, by the end of the 1940s, the voluntarist beliefs of the AFL came
to dominate the thinking of the American labor movement.
Similarly, the principles of workplace majoritarianism and exclusive

8)

(1989); Cath'Still Learning Something of Legislation' The Judiciary and the History of Labor
Law, 19 L AW AND SOClAL I NQU IRY 151 (1994).
9) CHRISTOPH ER L. TOMLlNS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGAN IZED LABOR M OVEM EN T IN AMERIC A, 1880-1960 (1985), 99-245; NELSON LI CHTENSTEIN , THE
STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LA BOR (2003), 54-97.
10) ALAN BRIN KLEY, THE END OF R EFORM: N EW DEAL LIB ERALISM I N R EC ESSION AN D WAR (1996),
201-226; TOMLlNS , supra note 9, at 317-28; LlCHTENSTEIN , supra note 9, at 141-77.
WI L LIAM FORBATH, LAW AND TH E SHAPING Of TH E AM ERICAN LABOR M OVEM EN T

e rine Fisk ,
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representation stemmed from the particular political context of the 1930s.
First of all, both doctrines were a response to the rise of company unions
in the 1920s and early 1930s. Trade unions realized that employers could
weaken independent unions by establishing their own unions in the workplace and tempting workers to join them with an offer of higher wages and
benefits, both of which would disappear once the threat of the independent
union passed. II ) Similarly, employers were able to undermine the ability of
unions to organize their workforces by playing rival unions off against one
another. 12) In particular, the 1930s saw bitter conflict between the AFL and
the CIO. By requiring workers to pick a single union and then prohibiting
other unions from representing workers at a give workplace, workplace majoritarianism and exclusive representation prevented employers from using
company unions or the rival federations to weaken an incumbent union.
The emphasis on workplace majoritarianism and exclusive representation
also reflected the political culture of the United States during the 1930s.
The Great Depression caused a dramatic upwelling of class consciousness
in the United States. l3 ) This resulted in a heightened belief in both the need
to use the law to redistribute wealth downwards and an emphasis on shaping public policy to the will of the majority. This contrasted dramatically
with an early twentieth century political culture that placed a much greater
weight on laissez-faire principles and individual rights against the government. Consequently, the fact that workplace majoritarianism and exclusive
representation had the effect of limiting the power of individuals to object
to union membership and to negotiate individual employment contracts
was seen as unproblematic. Because workplace majoritarianism and exclusive representation facilitated the will of the majority to redistribute wealth
from employers to workers, the rights of individual workers had to conform
to that goal. During the 1930s, American political culture did not value

11) LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 9, at 36-38; TOMLINS, supra note 9, at 84-85, 93-95, 132; PHILIP S.
FONER,3 HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 42-43 (1964); see also Daniel
Nelson, The Company Union Movement, 1900-1937: A Reexamination. 56 BUSINESS HISTORY
REVIEW 335-57 (1982).
12) TOMLINS, supra note 9, at 150-69, 177-99,248-50; LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 9, at 44-56; see
also ROBERT H. ZEIGER, FOR JOBS AND FREEDOM: RACE AND LABOR IN AMERICA SINCE 1865 11013, 127-29, 136-37 (2007).
13) For the basic historiography of the New Deal see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVElT AND THE NEW DEAL (1963); ANTHONY J. BADGER, THE NEW DEAL: THE DEPRESSION
YEARS 34-37 (1989); David KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR (1999); and IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF
OUR TIME (2013).
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individual autonomy as much as it did before, or as much as it would later. 14)
American labor law thus bears the mark of the historical period in which
it was created - suspicious of both courts and of the rights of the individual;
aimed at promoting economic equality; emphasizing private ordering and
the power of the group. American employment discrimination law, a legal
regime created during the 1960s, is a creature of a very different time. IS)
By the 1960s American political culture had changed dramatically from
the 1930s. 16 ) The rights that employment discrimination law created were
individual rights. Furthermore, these rights were not designed to protect
a particular economic class. Instead, they protected people from adverse
employment actions taken on the basis of some unchangeable characteristic
- race, sex, national origin. Additionally, employment discrimination law
was primarily enforced through private lawsuits in court rather than by
arbitrations or an administrative agency. Each of these elements of the law
of employment discrimination reflected significant changes in American
political culture between the 1930s and the 1960s
The first of these changes was the dramatic change in what the government viewed as the primary social problem in American society. Not
surprisingly, during the Great Depression, the government focused on economic inequality as the primary problem to be solved. Consequently, labor and employment laws such as the National Labor Relations Act or the
Fair Labor Standards Act were specifically aimed at red istributing wealth
downwards from employers to their workers.
After World War II, the problem of racial and ethnic discrimination
replaced economic inequality as the primary domestic problem that the
government sought to eradicate. I?) This change occurred for a variety of
reasons: postwar economic prosperity made class issues less salient to policy-makers; the Cold War and the rise of anticommunism caused policymakers to downplay any class conflict that did exist; American propaganda

14) Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise. and the Emergence of New
Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007); and WI LLI AME. NELSON, THE LEGAL.
1ST REFORMAT ION: LAW POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN NEWYORK , 1920-1980 (2002), 271-368.
15) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the prim ary piece offederallegislation prohibiting employment discrimination. 42 U. S.c. § 2000e. Many states also passed such legislation in the 1950s and 1960s. See, for example, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a)-(o).
16) Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition ofPluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1431-32, 1435 (2000); see also
NELSON, sup ra note 14.
17) THOMAS 1. SUG RUE, SW EET LAND OF LIBERTY : THE FORGOTTEN STRUGG LE FOR CiVIL RIGHTS
IN THE NORTH (2008); Michael 1. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROWN TO ClvrL RIGHTS: TH E SUPREM E
COU RT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUA LITY (2004); TAY LOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE:
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS (1998); TAYLOR BRANCH , AT CANA AN'S EDGE: AMERICA I.N THE
KI NG YEA RS (2006).
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portrayed the war against Nazi Germany as a war against racism and this
fact helped white Americans grow accustomed to the idea of racial and
ethnic pluralism even as it raised the expectations of racial and ethnic minorities in the United States; discriminatory racial practices in America
proved to be an obstacle as the United States and the Soviet Union sought
to gain allies among recently decolonialized countries in Asia and Africa. IS)
American labor and employment law followed this changed policy priority. During the 1950s, most states outside of the American South passed
laws prohibiting racial, ethnic and religious discrimination. 19) In 1964, the
federal government passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibited sex discrimination as welI.2°)
Another shift in American political culture was a change in how people
believed public policy should be made. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s,
most American policy-makers and politicians believed in what was called
"the group basis of politics."2I) The best public policy, it was believed,
was made when the government implemented policies that represented a
conlpromise among different interest groups. In the 1950s, such interest
groups were not condemned, as they are in contemporary American political culture, but were instead seen as the building blocks of a vibrant,
democratic society. They represented the collective interests of people
whose individual voices were easily ignored in a vast, complex society.
Compromises among interest groups were the best way to ensure that the
government implemented the wishes of most Americans. Labor and employment laws that promoted strong unions and elevated the power of the
union over that of its individual members (doctrines such as exclusive rep-

18) Sugrue, supra note 17, at 76-81, 96-102, 170-83,255-71,356-65 79-82 , 105,318. See also
MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AM ER ICAN DEMOCRACY
(2000),47-61, 79-82.
19) Francis H. Fox, Discrimination and Antidiscrimination in Massachus etts Law, 44 B.u. L.
R EV. 30 (1964); Derrick A. Bell, Jr. Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practice Act, 17 U. PlTT.
L. R EV. 438 (1955-1956); Elmer A. Carter, Practical Considerations of Anti-Discrimination
Legislation Experience Under the New York Law Against Discrimination , 40 CORNELL L.Q.
40 (1954-1955); Monroe Berger, The New York State Law Against Discrimination: Operation
and Administration, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 747 (1949-1950); Patricia Ward Crowe, Complainant
Reactions to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 12 LAW& SOCIETY REVIEW 217-36 (Winter 1978); Richard B. Dyson and Elizabeth D. Dyson, Commission Enforcement of State Laws Against Discrimination: A Comparative Analysis of the Kansas Act, 58
MICH . L. REV. 920 (1959-1960); Carl A. Auerbach, The 1967 Amendments to the Minnesota
State Act Against Discrimination and the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Discrimination Act: A comparative Analysis andEva/uation, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 231 (1967-1968);
Joseph Minsky, FEPC in Illinois: Four Stormy Years , 41 NOTRE DAME L. 152 (1965 -1966);
Charles H. Wiggins, Jr., Illinois Fair Employ ment Practices Act, 19650. ILL. L.F. 267 (1965).
20) 42 U.S .C. § 2000e.
21) Schiller, supra note 16, at 1438.
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resentation and workplace majoritarianism), fit perfectly with this way of
viewing the political process.
By the 1960s, the group basis of politics had fallen out of favor. 22 ) Interest groups came increasingly to be viewed as "special interests," whose
only concern was promoting the interest of their group over the public interest. As the 1960s wore on, Americans came to believe that government was
dominated by unrepresentative interest groups. The law, many believed,
needed to protect individuals from such groups. Indeed, the employment
discrimination laws that came into being in the 1960s were designed to
have such an effect - to protect individual rights against groups (such as
unions or corporations) that would discriminate against them.
The final change in American political culture that occurred between the
1930s, when America's basic labor laws were enacted, and the 1960s, when
its employment discrimination laws were passed, was a dramatic shift in
the role that courts were expected to play in American policy-making. In
the 1930s, the progressive politicians who came into power because of the
Great Depression hated courts. 23) They viewed them as reactionary entities
- allies of the business elites who were blamed for the Great Depression.
These courts held reform legislation unconstitutional. 24) They enjoined
strikes. 25 ) They convicted labor union activists. 261 Consequently, the judiciary was marginalized by the labor law regime these politicians created.
The law was implemented primarily by an administrative agency - the National Labor Relations Board - and by private arbitrations between unions
and employers that courts were expected to rubber stamp.
By the 1960s, however, courts were back in the favor of liberal policymakers Yl The politics of the federal judiciary in particular had changed
dramatically. Far from being the engine of reaction, during the 1950s,
federal courts were increasingly viewed as the institution responsible for
implementing liberalism's goal of racial and ethnic egalitarianism. The
United States Supreme Court was becoming increasingly active in protecting the constitutional rights of minorities and individuals. 28) Thus, when

22) Schiller, supra note 16, at 1410-13 .
23) Schiller, supra note 2, at 402-403.
24) Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S . 45 (1905); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918);
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Forbath supra note 8, at 37-58.
25) FELIX FRANKFURTER, TH E LABOR INJU NCTION (1930), 17-23; Forbath supra note 8, at 59-97.
26) In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); Forbath supra note 8, at 98-127.
27) Schiller, supra note 16, at 1423-26, 1443.
28) For an encyclopedic description of the rise of the federal judiciary as the promoter of ra-

cial egalitarianism and the protector of civil liberties in the years following World War 11,
see MELVIN 1. UROFSKY ET AL., 2 MARCH OF LIBERTY (2011). See also, LAURA KALMAN, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERA LfSM (1998).
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policy-makers in the 1960s began to craft a legal regime to combat employment discrimination, they entrusted it to courts. The primary method of
enforcing federal antidiscrimination laws would be lawsuits filed in courts.
Administrative agencies and private arbitrators were excluded from the
process.
These changes resulted into two legal regimes with very different sets of
rules and institutions. Labor law, crafted primarily in the 1930s and 1940s,
empowered the poor against the rich, and favored the rights of the group
over the individual. The law of employment discrimination, created during the 1960s, was concerned with the rights of minorities and women, not
the poor. Its goal was to protect individuals against the overbearing power
of the group. Furthermore, each area of law was enforced by different
institutions: labor law by an administrative agency and private arbitrators,
employment discrimination law by the courts. 29) These differing goals and
institutions resulted in a conflict between the two regimes. This conflict,
in turn, led to a great deal of instability and, ultimately, to the profound
weakening of labor unions in the United States.
The bitter struggle between unions and civil rights groups over the seniority provisions of collective bargaining agreements is an excellent example of this conflict. For the labor movement, seniority was one of the
most jealously guarded benefits that came out of the collective bargaining process. By ensuring that workers' promotions were based primarily
on how long they had been with a company, unions were able to constrain
an employer's freedonl to make promotions that were either arbitrary or
to the disadvantage of workers who had been in a particular job for a long
time.
From the perspective of African American workers, however, seniority
was an institution that ensured that they rarely got promoted and that they
were the first workers laid-off when economic times got hard. 30 ) Prior to
1964, almost all hiring in the United States was race-based. The best jobs
went to white workers. Black workers were excluded from the workforce
or given only the least desirable jobs. Even thought seniority was "race
neutral," its effect was to ensure that black workers remained on the lowest
rungs of the employment ladder, because they made up a disproportionate number of recently hired workers and workers in low-skilled, junior
positions. Since the 1940s, white union leaders had insisted that eventu-

29)

P AUL FRYM ER, BL AC K AND B LUE : AFRI CAN AM ERICAN S, TH E LABOR M OVEMENT, AND THE DE-

CLINE OF THE D EMOCR ATIC PART Y

30)

(2007), 22-43.
(2006), 29; Z EIGE R, supra note 12 , at 166 -67; see
W ORKERS IN WHI TE U N IONS (1977), 67- 69.

N ANC Y MACLEAN, FREEDO M IS N OT E NOUGH

also

WILLI AM B. G OU LD , BLACK
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ally African Americans would benefit from seniority provisions because
they would prevent racial discrimination by employers. 31 ) However, it never
seemed to work that way. Job turnover among black workers was exceptionally high not only because black workers were predominately in lower
skilled jobs but also because of endemic discrimination in both hiring and
promotion. Consequently, by the early 1960s, it was apparent that seniority
was of limited benefit to black workers. Indeed, it was clear that ridged enforcement of seniority provisions ensured that African American workers
remained in the lowest paying, most menial jobs.
The solution to this problem, as far as leaders of the Civil Rights Movement were concerned, was "affirmative action."32) African Americans, it
was argued, should be given "super-seniority" to make up for the fact that,
historically, they had been discriminated against. If ten percent of the population was African American, should not ten percent of the supervisors at
a given company be black? In its most extreme form, affirmative action
would require a company to promote African Americans to supervisory
positions, regardless of seniority, until the made of ten percent of all superVIsors.
The Civil Rights Movement sought to implement affirmative action programs in a number of ways.33) First of all, it used economic and political
pressure. During the early 1960s, it used picketing, strikes, boycotts, and
public protests to convince businesses to implement affirmative action programs in hiring and promotion. It also used its political muscle to convince
federal, state, and local governments to require the businesses they contracted with to implement affirmative action programs. In unionized workplaces, however, these tactics were unsuccessfuL When civil rights groups
convinced an employer to implement a program, the labor union representing that employer's workers would have the agreement thrown out as a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The white workers within
most unions did not wish to have their seniority diluted by such programs.
Because of this problem, the Civil Rights Movement developed different
tactics for promoting affirmative action programs in unionized workplac-

31) Z EIGER, supra note 12, at 167. See also SUGRUE, supra note 17, at 91-92.
32) MACLEAN, supra note 30, at 42-43 , 54-6 1; PAUL D. MORENO, FROM DIRECT A CTION TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAW AND POLICY I.N AM ERICA (1997),145-54,157-61 , 189-90;
JOHN D. SKRENTNY, TH E MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2002), 85, 87-89; SUGRUE, supra note
17, at 267-69,273-77.
33) SUGRUE, supra note 17, at 267-69, 271-285, 273-77.
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es. These tactics involved attacking the incumbent union. 34 ) Some African
American leaders called for the formation of independent, all-black unions,
to represent the needs of black workers exclusively. Others thought that
African American workers should stay within white-led unions, but that the
law should allow black workers to negotiate with employers directly. Each
of these strategies, African American leaders believed, would allow black
workers to pressure employers to implement affirmative action programs.
Of course, both strategies would also require the abandonment of the principle of exclusive representation. During the 1960s and 1970s, both the
National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts rejected the attempts
of African American workers to do this. 35)
The failure to implement affirmative action programs in unionized
workplaces either by direct pressure or by the abandonment of the principle
of exclusive representation, forced African American workers to use yet
another tactic, and this final one was successful. Starting in the late 1960s,
black workers began suing their employers and their unions using Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 36) When they won these law suits, which
they frequently did, they would request a remedy that included affirmative
action. If a court held that Title VII required the implementation of an affirmative action program, that holding would set aside the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. It would thus allow African
American workers who had been systematically discriminated against to
get superseniority, thereby leaping over white workers.
This campaign for affirmative action - the direct pressure, the attacks on
exclusive representation, and the lawsuits under Title VII - had a profound
effect on American politics in the late 1960s. 37 ) Labor union members and
African Americans were two of the main constituencies that supported the
Democratic Party, the political party that had dominated American politics
since the 1930s. This coalition began to break apart in the late 1960s as the

34) Frymer, supra note 29, 47-6\. See also JUDITH STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, RUNNING AMERICA :
RACE, ECONOMIC POLICY, AND THE DECLINE Of LIBERALI SM (\998); Kieran Taylor, American
Petrograd: Detroit and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers in AARON BRENNER, ET
AL., REBEL RANK AND FILE 311-54 (2010), 311-54.
35) Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition, 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
36) STEIN, supra note 34, at 147-96; FRYMER, supra note 29, at 71-72,83-90, 95-97; MACLEAN,
supra note 30, at 70-75, 103-104, 335-36.
37) JUDITH STEIN, PIVOTAL D ECADE: How THE UNITED STATES TRADED FACTOR IES AN D FINANCE IN
THE SEVENTIES (2010), 137-42; BRUCE J. SCHULMA N, TH E SEVENTIES: TH E GREAT SHI FT IN AMERICAN CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS (2001), 2-3 , 54-58; STEVE FRASER AND GARY GERSTLE,
EDS., THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 (1989), 231-32, 243-44, 248-49;
LAURA KALMAN, RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW POLITICS, 1974-1980 (2010), 180-94, 198-201 ;
THOMAS BYRNE EDSA LL AN D MARY D. EDSALL, CH AIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RI GHTS, RACE,
AND TAXES ON AM ERI CAN POLITICS (1992), 107-108, 122-31,136,138-39.
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opposition party - the Republicans - peeled white union members out of
this coalition by attacking affirmative action. Indeed, many white union
tnembers were happy to leave the Democratic Party, which they perceived
as dominated by African Americans and their white, liberal supporters,
who seemed intent on depriving them of the job security that seniority systems had provided.
This political conflict, which ultimately ended the Democratic Party's
domination of American politics, stemmed from law. Postwar American
liberalism had generated two labor and employment law regimes. One, created during the 1930s, sought to alleviate class disparities by empowering
unions and protecting them from outside pressures. The other, created during the 1960s, sought to eliminate racial discrimination by allowing individuals to sue their employers and their unions if either engaged in discriminatory employment practices. In the late 1960s, these two regimes were
being used to attack each other. Because they were based on antithetical
premises, neither was able to accommodate the interests of the other. Labor
law could not give up workplace majoritarianism, exclusive representation,
or volunteerism. Similarly, the law of employment discrimination could
not give up affirmative action and its right to sue unions over seniority systems. The inflexibility of each legal regime helped generate the political
conflict that weakened American liberalism, and ended the power of the
Democratic Party.
This narrative helps explain the rise of the Republican Party in the 1970s
and the movement of the Democratic Party to the political center during
the 1990s. It also helps explain why labor unions in the United States have
become so weak in the last thirty years. The extensive conflicts that they
have had with non-white workers have made it increasingly difficult for
labor unions to recruit members of the United States' increasingly diverse
workforce. This story also illustrates a broader point relevant to anyone
who studies the law. When we study law we frequently focus on its smallest
details: How do you determine if a contract is binding? What is the remedy
for a particular injury? How does a government agency issue regulations?
How else would we learn the law without such attention to the intricacies
of legal doctrine? Because we spend so much time focused on these details,
however, we frequently lose sight of the fact that law is a product of society.
The law is shaped by the politics and the culture in which it sits, just as the
law shapes politics and culture.

